Most economic models assume that individuals act out their preferences based on their own self interest. However there have also been other paradigms in the economics literature that have tried to capture alternative manifestations of human behavior that include fairness. This study examines people's preferences when it comes to their travel time and their income and what type of trade offs they are willing to make to live in a society where the distributions of travel time and income are fairer. Using a stated preference experiment we find that when it comes to travel time, individuals are more concerned with societal average travel time, followed by their own travel time and finally by large inequalities in the society, while in the case of income they are more concerned with their own income, followed by societal average and finally by inequality.
Introduction
"Time is Money" goes the old saying. Similarities abound between the two. We all have to live within a time as well as monetary budget. Within the 24 hours in a day, we schedule our daily activities and prioritize among them. We are willing to spend some of our budget for example to travel to activities or on occasion we can choose to waste it by being tardy. We also treat money in the same fashion, trying to live within a budget and spending it on worthy opportunities. Both time and money are scarce resources.
There are of course differences between the two. The value of time is contingent on the activities it is tied to. For instance, time during a leisure drive is valued different from that over the morning commute which is again different from what it would be when being rushed in an emergency. Money on the other hand doesn't suffer from such fluctuations in the short run, while over the long run its value can change quite dramatically. We are also all limited to 24 hours in a day, while our incomes are significantly variable with higher incomes implying more flexibility on the transactions we choose to undertake.
Then there is also a question of how people view time and money. The impact of the distribution of income is in most cases readily apparent in disparities in health and living conditions. While impacts of a wide distribution of travel time may not be readily apparent be they in increases in travel disutility or levels of pollution that arise from excessive driving. In a sense the latter is a result of active choice of where to work, shop, play, and live by (Levinson and Kumar, 1994) , while the distribution of income has more complex social, historic as well as individual contributions.
This leads us to the question of how similar or different distributional concerns over time and money may be. Specifically we ask how people evaluate their own position within that distribution, and what tradeoffs are they willing to make to live in areas where fairer distributions are possible. This is in contrast with what traditional economic models assume. The traditional paradigm is that people are self interested actors and that their choices are derived with the goal of minimizing their own costs or maximizing their individual utilitity without regard to those around them. In the case of travel time, the rational decision maker is expected to minimize time spent in travel and "save" it for other worthy activities. The same actor would also want to maximize their income without regard to others.
That choices are self interested is true to a large extent. We choose where we live so that it is convenient for us. We choose a particular route to go to work because we know how it performs from experience. No one makes a choice so as to minimize other peoples travel time, nor will they succeed if they wanted to do so. This is however not to argue that individuals would not want a reduction of over all travel time or a fairer distribution of travel time even while being self interested. These preferences are possible because positive outcomes may be realized or be perceived from such an arrangement if for example some level of fuel efficiency is realized or if lower levels of pollution are perceived from such an arrangement.
In addition people may perceive that being fair to others, which often is a group that includes friends and relatives, is essentially a good thing. In a more practical sense, the willingness for such tradeoffs can be extended to measures that redistribute travel time. For instance ramp metering, signals, advanced traveler information systems, and other Intelligent Transportation Systems technologies by their very nature adjust time distributions while fulfilling different objectives (e.g. see Zhang and Levinson, 2005) . The implication here would be that individuals may have a willingness to pay (at least a willingness to give up some of their own travel times), if they knew for sure that policy measures can leave a majority of others well off.
Fairness in income distributions, can also be motivated by a variety of concerns none of which are necessarily looking at fairness itself as an end (Scanlon, 2000) . If one perceives that more equality will lead to a better quality of life, better healthcare, less crime, or better schools, these may in fact be within the individual's self interest since these benefits apply to the individual as well as their kin. Again the self interested paradigm need not change to accommodate these concerns within the traditional utilitarian framework.
A framework of fair decision making can also be found in the theory of John Rawls. In his Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls argues that rational individuals would, from behind the veil of ignorance (i.e. without knowing what their own position would be), choose allocation of resources that ensure the wellbeing of those at the bottom of the distribution. Such an approach has received some support for example in Michelbach et al. (2003) .
Several experiments from ultimatum games summarized in Thaler (1988) provide evidence for the existence of fairness consideration in decision making. In such games a proposer would offer an acceptor a share s of an amount x. In the event of acceptance, the proposer gets (x-s) and acceptor s, and in the case of rejection, both get nothing. Whereas the game theoretic solution to this problem is that the proposer should offer a very small amount and the acceptor should accept any positive gain, experimental findings do not reflect this outcome.
For instance in the experiments of Guth et al. (1982) most of the offers made by the proposers were generous and were accepted, while in the experiments of Kahneman et al. (1986) , respondents were willing to reject what were unfair offers even when it meant the payoffs to themselves would have been positive. Such outcome, at least on the part of the acceptor, signifies a willingness to pay to attain fairness from others (Kahneman et al., 1986) . The proposer also may be motivated by a need for fairness while the fear of rejection might also induce a fair offer.
Attempts to incorporate fairness into traditional economic models have been made. For instance Rabin (1993) proposes a model where people are nice to those that are nice to them, and mean to those that are mean to them. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) offer a theory of fairness based on the hypothesis that individuals want equitable outcomes. A utility form is proposed that penalizes an unfair allocation. In this framework, both an advantageous (where the individual is earning more than others) as well as a disadvantageous inequality (where they are earning less) are penalized. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also find support for inequality aversion using their theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition. They propose to account for the anomalies in the experiments with a model where players try to maximize a "motivation function" which depends on their pecuniary payoff (in absolute terms) and their relative share of the payoff. Engelmann and Strobel (2002) , on the other hand, argue that efficiency and maximin (maximizing minimum payoffs) strategies explain the observed behavior rather than the inequality aversion models offered in (1999) and (2000) .
Adopting a different strategy from the game theoretic approach, Carlsson et al.(2005) try to understand whether individuals are inequality averse or just risk averse. In their study they ask respondents to choose a society for their grandchild to live in using uniform income distributions. In one set of cases, the position of the grandchild is given and in another the position is not know. They propose utility forms from which both risk aversion and inequality aversion coefficients can be extracted. When the position for the grandchild is known, there is no risk in the choice, and choices out to reflect preferences on inequality. While when the grandchild's position is unknown, both risk and inequality aversion can play a role in the decision. In addition, they find that many people are inequality averse as well as risk averse. In addition they report a sizable correlation between individual risk and inequality aversion.
The survey for our study is similar to the one used by Carlsson et al. (2005) but with a few notable differences including the types of distributions used and the method of analysis. Our aim is to test if distributional considerations correlate well with people's preferences both in time and in money. The following section discusses the survey and participants followed by the analysis and interpretations of the empirical evidence in our study.
Survey
The data for this survey comes from a computer based stated preference survey administered at the University of Minnesota in March of 2006. The stated preference approach was chosen because it allows us to explore tradeoffs that individuals make that are hard to observe in real life. In addition we are able to test preferences over a range of individual and societal travel time and income distributions and tradeoffs that in reality would not be observed for the same individual. A revealed preference approach would be very difficult to undertake because there are many factors outside of the researchers control (and some outside the control of the respondent) that dictate the type of society that one lives in. This approach gives us more control over the variables of interest. Even with some of its limitations (Louviere et al., 2000) , a stated preference approach seems to be the most straight forward way to empirically evaluate the tradeoffs we are interested in this paper.
The survey consists of two parts. One part deals with the distribution of travel time in the community people live in and their own position in that distribution, and a second part deals with the distribution of income and the person's position in that distribution. Prior to starting the survey individuals are given a quick tutorial on interpreting distributions that are presented by using histograms. The tutorial takes them through mean and variance identification, comparing mean and variance of different distributions, reading frequency of an event occurrence based on given distributions and identifying their own positions within a distribution when explicitly indicated (Figures 1 and 2) The survey then presents the respondents with a series of binary alternatives where they make choices based on their own personal position as well as the position of those around them in the travel time and income contexts discussed above. There were a total of 3 randomizations which were used to preorder the survey questions. In addition the information was presented in two ways. In one case the distributions for the alternatives were placed one over the other and in the other they were placed side by side. One of these was installed per computer. As respondents came in, they were each randomly assigned to a computer.
The travel time questions are posed as before and after scenarios resulting from a change in policy. Respondents are told that a study is underway to put in place a new ramp metering strategy. They are informed that when put in place, this strategy will lead to a redistribution of travel time for people in the Twin Cities area. Histograms are used to depict the travel time distributions in the before and after scenarios. The respondents' own personal position in either case is also identified (Figure 3) . The respondent is then asked to choose between the before and after distributions.
In the second case, we consider income. In this case, the respondents are told that a job offer is on the table for them which requires them to relocate to a new area. There are two job offers located in two different cities. The respondent is told that the positions are virtually identical and that the cost of living is equal in either city. The income distribution in the two locations is however different. In either case the distribution of income for each city's residents is given using a histogram and the offered salary for the respondent is also given (Figure 4) . The respondent is then asked to choose between the two jobs.
Respondents were given eighteen questions relating to time preferences and seventeen questions relating to income preferences. For three of the time questions and four of the income questions, respondents are asked to choose a distribution from a veil of ignorance (i.e. without knowing their own personal position in either distribution). These questions will allow us to test whether there is evidence for such motives in our sample. It also gives us the opportunity to test if such motives are present in travel time distributions where people try to avoid extreme outcomes for others.
In these scenarios, the respondent must decide if they are willing to trade some of their own income or travel time to live in a region that has a more equal distribution. Our hypothesis is that individuals will use a combination of their own and society's average to make decisions.
Subjects for the survey were recruited via email from the University of Minnesota's employee database. Invitations were sent out to 2500 randomly selected non-faculty, non-student employees who had not participated in previous transportation studies conducted by the authors. The recruitment email indicated that individuals were invited to participate in a computer based commute study and offered $15 for participation. Participants were asked to come to a central testing station, where the survey was administered. Based on previous experience of similar recruitments, a target of 200 participants was set (split evenly between male and female). A total of 187 respondents agreed and participated in the study. Of these six were dropped from the analysis because they failed to provide demographic information that was used in the model fitting. Descriptive statistics of the 181 subjects used in this study are given in Table 1 .
Analysis and Results
The analysis herein assumes a rational utility maximizing individual. We use a linear utility function, but one which considers distributional concerns by using the average and range of the distribution to the right and left of the median. Specifically we use the right range for travel time (the higher 50% for the population) as a measure of how widely distributed travel time is and the extent of the inequality in this worse off group, and we use the range for the left range for income to measure the extent of inequality in this group. In the cases where respondents do not know where their position is concerns over risk are also captured using the range variables. It is assumed that a risk-averse individual would seek to reduce the risk of an unwanted outcome by reducing these ranges. Since the choice alternatives in our experiment are binary, we use a binomial logit choice model to estimate the parameters of the utility form we present. The model estimation was done using the R package (2005).
Four models of choice are explored, two of which are for travel time and the other two are for income. In each of these cases one model describes the choice mechanism as it relates to questions where the respondents know their positions and the other where they do not. The hypothesized utility form for either case is as follows.
For the case of travel time:
Where The shared demographic variables X, A, E, H and P represent Sex, Age, Education, Household Size, and Personal Income.
In the veil of ignorance models, T is removed from the travel time model, as well as I from the income model as the respondents were not told their travel time and income. The estimated models showed statistically significant order and presentation effects. People who received the questions in order 2 and order 3 had essentially what could be interpreted as different intercepts from those in order 1. Similarly, those who got the questions in the top and bottom format performed differently from those that got the distributions presented side by side. While the intercept terms were different, estimation of separate models for the different populations shows that the coefficients were statistically not different.
Travel Time
The models for travel time are given in Table 2 . Model 1 is for the scenario where the respondent's know their position and model 2 is for the veil of ignorance travel time experiment. In the first case, an increase in the person's travel time (T), as well as an increase in the Twin Cities residents' average travel time (S) and an increase in the range (R) for the top half of residents' travel time all lead to a disutility. The ordering of the magnitudes of the disutility from a one unit increase in each case is such that S > T > R.
The ramp metering strategy is more likely to be rejected if it increases the areas average travel time significantly (CI (-0.254,-0.200), p-val=0.000), followed by if it increased the respondents travel time significantly (CI (-0.207,-0.156), p-val=0.000) or if it increased the range for the worse off 50% (CI (-0.145,-0.104), p-val=0.000). A one minute increase in the area's travel time leads to a 20.3% reduction in the odds of choice, while a one unit increase in the individual's travel time leads to a 16.5% reduction in the odds of choice for that alternative. A one minute expansion in the right range similarly leads to an 11.7% reduction in the odds of choice.
The implication of this model is that as long as appropriate reductions in one or more of these variables are made people are willing to accept policy changes that leaves them or those around them better off. Significantly, at least in this stated preference model, as long as the metropolitan average improves by an equal or larger amount than the respondent's own travel time worsens, the impact on utility is positive.
In the analysis the alternative for which the odds are being modeled had a lower travel time for the respondent. As can be seen from the model, all things equal, men were much less likely to choose this alternative than women reducing the odds by 41.5% (pval=0.000). Each additional of $1000 in personal income (wealthier people in real life) increased the odds of choosing the lower travel time alternative by 0.76% (p-val=0.003).
In the case where the individuals own position was not given, both the right range and the metropolitan average time were important in individual choice (model 2). The dependent choice variable in this model is the alternative with the lower average metropolitan travel time. An increase in the metropolitan average travel time reduces the odds of choice by 13.6%, while an in the right range of the distribution reduced the odds by 13.4%. There is a large and significant gender effect, with men having about 91% higher odds (pval=0.004) to choose the lower average travel time alternative than men, all other things equal. There is also a significant age effect (p-val=0.033) where older individuals have a lower odds of choosing the lower metropolitan average travel time alternative as compared to their younger counterparts, after controlling for all other factors.
In both settings (own position known and unknown), there is a motivation to reduce the extreme travel times experienced by a segment of the society. The results from model 2 suggest that from a veil of ignorance people would seek lower levels of inequality by lowering the range of possible travel times. This is also consistent with risk-averse behavior where an individual would attempt to reduce the risk of being in an extreme group. The fact that even when not behind the veil of ignorance, people still seek to reduce the range of extreme travel times, and the closeness of these estimates in model 1 and model 2, suggests that these choices have more to do with inequality aversion rather than risk aversion.
Using data from a separate experiment on the same subjects, a metric was also developed for each individual's attitude toward risk. This metric was the proportion of time that the respondent chose a route with a higher possibility of arrival later than their usual travel time (ranging from zero to one) (Levinson and Tilahun, 2006) . When this metric was used as an independent indicator in the model to see if risk-averse people were also inequality averse, we failed to find any evidence of such a relationship. Subsequently the variable was dropped from the model in both model 1 and model 2.
Income
The models for income are given in Table 3 . Model 3 presents the results for when the individual's position is known and model 4 for the veil of ignorance experiment. In model 3, own income, the city residents' average income, as well as the inequality for the lower 50% are all important determinants of where the respondents chose to live. The choices show that the higher the individual's income the higher the utility derived, the higher the average income for the city residents, the higher the utility for the individual. A wide range to the left (from the poorest to the median) leads to a disutility. In terms of their impact on utility, the respondents own income (I) contributes the most, inducing about 4.4% increase in the odds of choice with each $1000 in own income (p-val=0.000). This is followed by the city's average income (S), which leads to a 2.9% increase in odds for each $1000 dollar increase. Finally this is followed by the an aversion to large inequality for the lower 50% of earners (L), reducing the odds of choice by 1.4% for each $1000 dollar increase in this range. Among these decision determinants, the order in terms of magnitude of impact on utility is I > S > L.
In the income analysis where position was known (model 3), the city for which the odds of choice are calculated always had a higher personal income offer for the respondent. We find that more self-centered choices correlate with people with a higher personal income reported in the demographic portion of the survey all things held equal, while more educated and older individuals appear to be less self-centered as compared to their counterparts. After controlling for all other variables, older individuals were less disposed towards the high income alternative with each additional year reducing the odds of choice by 1.2% (p-val=0.004). Similarly, after controlling for other variables, those with college or higher levels of education were less disposed to this alternative as compared to those with lower levels of education with the odds of choice being 35.1% lower(p-val=0.000). Finally those with higher incomes seemed to favor the high income alternative, with a 1.6% (p-val=0.003) increase in the odds of choice for each $1000 increase in their reported income.
Order and presentation effects are significant in this case also, with those receiving the question in order 2 and 3 as well as those with that received the distributions in top and bottom format having higher dispositions for alternative 1 even though the questions themselves in these presentations were presented in a random order.
In contrast with the position known experiment, the veil of ignorance model is much more limited (model 4). The dependent alternative in this model is the alternative with the higher average city income. Without knowing what their personal income in either city would be, individuals were primarily interested in living at the location where the average income was higher. A $1000 increase in this average leads to a 6.5% increase in the odds of choice. Inequality seems to play no significant role in this choice. There is also evidence that individuals who reported a higher income in the demographic questions had a higher odds of choosing that alternative as compared to those with lower incomes, with their odds of choice being 1.5% higher for each $1000. Age on the other hand seems to play an opposite role, where there seems to be some evidence that older individuals were less likely to opt for the higher average alternative as compared to older ones (p-val==0.086).
Value Measures
In order to express the tradeoffs that individuals are willing to make among the distributional variables tested here and their own positions, one can use the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). The MRS measures at what rate one is willing to exchange a unit one variable for another while keeping utility the same. For any two variables V 1 and V 2 the MRS is calculated as follows:
For a linear utility function, this is just the ratio of the estimated coefficients from our model. These are the amounts of time and money respectively an individual would be willing to give up (own-minutes or own-dollars) for a one unit betterment in the average or range of those around them. For the travel time case we will calculate own-minute per society's average minute, or own-minute per reduction of society's travel time upper range. In the income case, we are interested in own-dollars per dollar increase in society's average income or own-dollars per dollar reduction in society's lower range. The variable V 2 in the travel time case will then be T and in the income case will be I. V 1 will take on R and S for the time as well as income case.
The values for these estimates are summarized in table 4. Respondents on average are willing to trade a 1 minute reduction in the right range of the travel time distribution by adding 0.55 minutes in their own travel time, while a one unit reduction in the metropolitan average travel time is worth 1.25 own minutes.
In the veil of ignorance experiment, a 1 unit reduction in the right range is worth 0.98 minutes on the metropolitan average while the same trade off when the individuals knows their position is worth 0.55 minutes on the metropolitan average. Once the individuals know their position, then their willingness to trade off more of society's average travel time is reduced. This is due to the emphasis they give to metropolitan average time over the right range in the position known case as compared to the position unknown case.
When it comes to income, the most important variable is own-income. For both a dollar increase in the average income, or a dollar reduction of the left range, individuals on average are willing to give up less than a dollar. A one dollar increase in average income is worth giving up $0.65 of their money, while a one unit reduction in the left range is worth $0.32. Similar tradeoffs cannot be made for the veil of ignorance experiment because none of the possible predictors of choice came out statistically significant.
The results indicate that personal choice has motivations beyond personal travel time and personal income. We find that larger inequalities in both income and time for the worse off half of the population are shunned upon. In the case of travel time, we see that individuals are willing to add on average 1.25 minutes on their commutes for each minute of reduction in the population's average. In the case of income, decisions reflect that people can forego some personal income to choose to live in a wealthier as well as more equal city, trading off $0.65 of their own money to live in a place that has $1 more in average income, and trading $0.32 to live in a more equal city.
Conclusion
This study explores the preferences for personal position and societal distribution for income and travel time. Inequality is measured using the range for the top 50% for travel and the bottom 50% for income. We find that choice motivations go beyond that of personal travel time. In particular we find that individuals are willing trade about 1.25 minutes for each minute reduction in the areas overall average travel time. Motivations for a reduction of excessive driving is also appealing if a policy change can effect such a change with individuals willing to trade about 0.68 minutes of their own for a reduction of that range.
In the case of income as well, choices reflect wider considerations beyond own income. The findings from the models imply that the most important contributor is the increase in own income but that there are also gains from increasing overall average income and reducing the disparity in the low 50%. While the willingness to forego some income may be altruistic for some people, others may be thinking about wider implications that may in the end come back as benefits to them. Stability, less crime, better schools and other services that depend on the public good may be features that people associate with more equal distributions, or ones that have lower levels of poverty. As such giving up income may not be as altruistic as it may appear. Altruistic or not, the models highlight how to some extent individuals are basing their decisions on the well being of others around them in addition to their own welfare. 
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